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Abstract
Beyond dogmatism: Rationality in theology and science
The justification of cognitive claims in theology can be dealt with 
adequately only if the epistemological issues of metaphorical reference, 
experiential adequacy and explanatory progress are seen as crucial 
problems for the more encompassing problem of rationality in theology. 
To claim some form of reality depiction the theologian will have to argue 
for a plausible theory of reference on the basis of interpreted religious 
experience. In this discussion important analogies between the rationality 
of theological theorizing and the rationality of science are revealed. Thus 
explanatory progress in theology shows itself to be a form of inference to 
the best explanation, and the rationahty of both theology and science is 
therefore determined by certain epistemic values.
Critical theologians, in an attempt to transcend the intellectual coma of 
fideism and dogmatism, have to face up to a very special kind of 
challenge: the truth claims of religious assertions. Religious beliefs are 
normally held to be true, not merely useful, and their assertions about 
reality are universal in intent. This also raises the question of the 
possible role of explanatory justification in theology: what do religious 
beliefs explain and can their cognitive claims be justified in any way?
The theologian of course has to realize that the questions raised by 
reflecting on religion are not those raised by science. Accepting that 
different kinds of knowledge are involved in the practices of science 
and theology and that neither can provide the content of the other's 
knowledge, does not mean that they do not inform the context within 
which their respective knowledge is to be constructed (cf Barker 1981:
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276). This epistemological problem reveals the common adherence of 
theology and all the sciences to the problem of rationality, as we shall 
soon see. It also challenges us to evaluate the role of justification and 
explanation in both theology and science.
The relationship between explanatory power and truth has always 
been a central issue in the understanding of science, and is today even 
more problematical (McMullin 1986: 52). Philosophers of science have 
also convincingly pointed out that there can be no undisputed and 
monolithic notions of 'reality' or of 'explanation' in science: the objects 
of our interest not only dictate different strategies, but also different 
views on what could be regarded as adequate forms of explanation. But 
the central question remains: does theology exhibit a rationality com­
parable to the rationality of science, and how plausible can an explan­
atory justification of the cognitive claims of theology be?
In this paper I would like to show that the rationality of science and 
theology is in each case determined by certain goals and criteria, that is, 
by certain epistemic values. In both theology and science, whatever 
their other differences might be, the supreme value that determines 
rationality is intelligibility. What is real for theology and for science is 
not the observable but the intelligible (cf Barbour 1971: 170), and in 
both theology and science beliefs and practices are attempts to under­
stand at the deepest level, where understanding can be construed as 
seeking the best explanation (cf Proudfoot 1985: 43). What is at stake, 
therefore, is not only the general epistemic status of religious belief, but 
especially the implications this will have for the epistemic and thus 
rational integrity of theological discourse as such. At the same time the 
high degree of personal involvement, that is of faith and commitment, 
in religion and theology will present a very special challenge to any 
theory of rationality in theology. Because of this, and because of the 
contextuality of religious experience and the cognitive claims that arise 
from this, I shall argue for a theory of rationality in theology that 
encompassss both experiential adequacy and epistemological ade­
quacy.
RATIONALITY IN THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE
Constructing a model of rationality that can deal adequately with a 
theology that claims cognitivity and reality depiction for its central 
statements, will certainly not be an easy task. Not only is rationality a
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word protean in its meanings (cf Echeverria 1986: 372), but the lasting 
influence of positivism and the prestige of the natural sciences is a 
direct challenge, not only to our view of the sciences (cf Schoen 1985: 
vii), but also to our concept of rationality. Post-Kuhnian philosophy of 
science has shown us that there can be no sharp line of demarcation 
between scientific rationality and all other forms of rationality (cf Van 
Huyssteen 1986: 63ff). In fact, rationality in science relates to the 
'reasonableness' or a more basic kind of rationality that informs all 
goal-directed human action. In this sense one might have a richer 
theory of rationality that not only includes emperical adequacy but also 
compatability with metaphysical or philosophical theories (cf Newton- 
Smith 1981: 7).
In spite of some important differences between theology and the 
other sciences, I would identify rationality as an epistemological issue 
that ties in directly with the overall goals of theology and science, that 
is, intelligibility as an understanding at the deepest possible level. In 
this sense rationality would imply a reliance on argument and expla­
nation and in accepting those models which appears to be the most 
effective problem solvers in terms of certain criteria of rationality. These 
criteria could be seen as rules specifying what would count as reasons 
for believing something. In this sense they function as epistemic values 
that directly tie in with the goals of our theorizing. Rationality in 
theology and science is therefore directly related to these goals, and if 
the goals change or more important ways of realizing these goals are 
found, rationality itself will change (cf McMullin 1987: 17). And if 
science and theology are complex intellectuals activities of specific 
communities of inquirers, there is no way to prescribe a certain 'type' 
of rationality for that activity without looking at its actual practice.
With this in mind, it is important to reflect on the fact that Ian 
Barbour (cf Barbour 1971) has already identified a critical realist model 
of rationality that accommodates the inter-action of experience and 
interpretation, the use of models and analogies, and the role of a 
community of inquiry in both theology and science. Barbour's argu­
ment that personal involvement in science and religion differ only in 
degree and that the knowing subject always makes an important 
contribution to all knowledge, will not only have to be developed 
further but will also have profound implications for the problem of 
rationality in theology.
In theology we seek as secure a knowledge as we can achieve, a 
knowledge that will allow us to understand and where possible to
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construct theories as better explanations. This goal of theology not only 
determines the rationality of theology, but very much depends on the 
way we deal with the problem of the justification of cognitive claims in 
theology. And if in both theology and science we want to understand 
and explain, then surely the rationality of science is directly relevant to 
that of theology.
CRITICAL REALISM IN THEOLOGY
In any analysis of the development of theories of rationality in contem­
porary philosophy of science, the very recent development of different 
forms of qualified scientific realism after decades of positivism and the 
ensuing constant threat of a post-Kuhnian paradigmatic relativism, can 
definitely be seen as one of the most remarkable and welcome features 
of the scientific thought of our time (cf Burham 1985: 28). The fact that 
the concept 'realism' can in an epistemological sense be called the 
catch-word of the 1980's (cf Peacocke 1984: 11) and that there seem to be 
almost as many scientific realisms as there are scientific realists, was 
discussed at length in my Theology and the Justification o f Faith (1986) 
and The Realism o f ihe Text (1987). What is of importance for this paper 
is that in scientific realism the notion of explanatory success is central 
as is the view that there is good reason to believe in the existence of 
entities substantially like those postulated by theories that have been 
successful over a long period of time.
Eman McMullin (1986: 57) who opts for this kind of restricted 
realism, also qualifies this definition in some important ways:
• realism commits one to saying that there are 'good reasons' but not 
that there are compelling grounds. The logical possibility that even a 
highly successful theory might be false, should be held open;
• any theory may therefore develop further and can in principle be 
revised and sharpened;
• only theories that have already shown a considerable degree of 
explanatory power would qualify as having reliable ontological 
implications;
• the explanatory success of a theory suggests truth and never implies 
truth.
The success of a theory in a qualified form of scientific realism does 
therefore not warrant the claim that something exactly corresponding to
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this construct exists. The success of a theory can at best warrant a claim 
that an entity possessing among others the properties attributed to it by 
the theory, exists. This not only accounts for the notion of approximate 
truth in realism, but also for the central role of metaphors in scientific 
theorizing (cf McMullin 1984: 30ff). Theories -  and their metaphors -  
thus provide epistemic access to entities that could not have been 
known otherwise.
For the theologian realism as an epistemological theory of rationality, 
is of course very appealing because it is rather obvious that Christians 
have traditionally been realists one way or the other (cf Soskice 1987; 
109). The problem is, however, if this position can be philosophically 
defended, and if so, what form of realism would be appropriate for 
theology? And even more important: what specific problem should 
realism in theology address? I will eventually argue for a qualified and 
weak form of critical realism in theology: a realism that does not offer a 
strong defence of theism but deals with the cognitive claims of religious 
language and theological reflection. And to counter the claims of the 
instrumentalist that religious language provides a useful system of 
symbols which can be action guiding and meaningful for the believer 
without being ontologically referential or reality dipicting, the critical 
realist in theology will have to attempt to say how religious language 
can claim to be about God at all.
I therefore am convinced that anyone considering the possibilities of 
qualified forms of realism for theology should be extremely wary of an 
uncritical, superficial transferring of the realism of science to the 
domain of religious belief, and to theology as the reflection on the 
claims of this belief. At the basis of the reasons for using this term is the 
conviction that what we are provisionally conceptualizing in theology, 
really exists. This basic assumption and the good reasons we have for it, 
makes it possible for theologians, like scientists, to believe they are 
theorizing in a valid, progressive and therefore successful way.
The strength of the critical realist position certainly lies in its 
insistence that both the objects of science and the objects of religious 
belief lie beyond the range of literal description (cf McMullin 1985: 47). 
I personally think this eventually represents a major advance in our 
understanding of what not only science, but also theology, can achieve. 
To put it in Arthur Peacocke's (1984: 51) words: the scientific and 
theological enterprises share alike the tools of groping humanity: 
words, ideas, images that have been handed down, which we refashion 
in our own way for our own times in the light of present-day
HTS 44/4 (1988) 851
experience. Science and theology, for the Christian, can therefore only 
be seen as interacting and mutually illuminating approaches to reality. 
What exactly is meant by 'reality' in this context, will of course have to 
be carefully analysed. I think Peacocke, as regards the issue of reality in 
science and theology, is correct in warning against a form of discrimi­
nation when we attribute 'reality' as such. Indeed there is no sense in 
which subatomic particles are to be regarded as 'more real' than a 
bacterial cell or a human person or, even, social facts or God (Peacocke 
1984: 36).
When Peacocke, however, proceeds to relate these realities to dif­
ferent levels of reality, a cut through the totality of reality, it does 
become more problematical. It could imply that realism should then 
apply in a similar way to the fields of both science and theology, which 
would be highly problematical. I think McMullin (1985: 39) pinpoints 
the problem by underlining the fact that there is no way that science 
and theology could deal with the same reality, and rather than saying 
that there are different 'levels' of reality, one should realize that science 
and theology for the most part deal with different domains of the same 
reality. He states it very clearly (McMullin 1985: 40): 'Science has no 
access to God in its explanations; theology has nothing to say about the 
specifics of the natural world'.
Where I do, however, think the two overlap, is on the epistemological 
level of reflection or human knowledge: each has something important 
to say about two very different but also very important domains of 
reality. To me this is crucial: it is on this level, the problem of the 
reliability of theological knowledge and the justification of its cognitive 
claims, that a theory of critical realism will have to be put to the test and 
not at all in the sense of 'proving' that the Reality theology is talking 
about, really exists or could be only a 'useful fiction' for helping people 
to lead better lives. In this sense McMullin (1985: 39) also sympathizes 
with the claim that both science and theology could be regarded as 
'realist', that is, as making reliable truth-claims about domains of 
reality that lie beyond our experience.
RATIONALITY AND REFERENCE
The problem of the justification of the cognitive claims of theological 
statements has now been rephrased as the question of how religious 
and theological statements can claim to be about God at all. This
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question has not only surfaced as the central problem for any qualified 
form of critical realism in theology but also implies further problems 
such as: how do we know that religious and theological language 
manage to refer and can be regarded as reality-depicting? How is 
reference fixed in religious and theological language, and is it fixed in 
such a way that the cognitive claims of theology can be justified one 
way or the other? The answer to these questions will prove to be 
directly related to the way metaphor function in religious language. It 
will also determine the epistemological adequacy of critical realism as a 
model of rationality for theology, and because of the experiential 
grounding of metaphorical concepts (cf Botha 1986: 380; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 19f), will provide a key to experiential adequacy in 
theological theorizing.
The high degree of personal involvement in theological theorizing 
not only reveals the relational character of our being-in-the-world, but 
epistemologically implies the mediated and interpretative character of 
all religious experience. In a sense one's concept of experience will 
therefore entail one's concept of meaning, which in turn will determine 
one's concept of knowledge (cf Gill 1981: 19). On this view, religious 
experience and the way we define it, serves as a matrix out of which 
meaning and knowledge as a basis for theological theorizing arises. But 
religious language is the way in which alleged religious experiences are 
expressed, and in this sense no religious experience can be seen as 
pre-linguistic or uninterpreted. The theory-ladeness of all data in the 
sciences thus parallels the interpreted nature of all religious experience. 
The underdetermination of theories by data is therefore -  epistemologi­
cally -  as important in theology as in the sciences (cf Van Huyssteen 
1987: 32ff).
The important fact that all religious experience is interpreted exper­
ience therefore implies that religious language is constitutive of exper­
ience as much as it is expressive of it. And because of the mediated 
structure of the religious dimension of all experience, other experiences 
provide the context for religious awareness. But even more important: 
if religious experience is mediated and intentional, then the most 
appropriate language form for this type of experience would be meta­
phorical language. In fact: the use of metaphors and models in religious 
cognition -  a use which parallels that in scientific cognition -  also 
argues for the claim that the structure of religious cognition is that of 
interpreted experience (cf Rottschaefer 1985: 269).
The basic question now emerging from all this is: how is the alleged
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cognitive claims or referential value of religious language -  and event­
ually also of theological language -  affected if all religious experience is 
interpreted experience and thus articulated in theory-laden terms 
emerging from a particular tradition of faith? This question can also be 
phrased in a different way: how can metaphorical language be referen­
tial and reality depicting prior to and without definite knowledge of 
the referent? (cf Soskice 1987: 111). In other words, how can we know 
that religious language, and the theological theories that are creatively 
constructed in terms of this language, refer if that to which it refers is 
still unknown to us?
Regarding this important problem and its direct relevance for the 
problem of the justification of the cognitive claims of theological 
statements, important studies by Saul Kripke (1972) and Hilary Putnam 
(1975) argue that reference can indeed take place independent of the 
possession or availability of any definite description or definite prior 
understanding of what is being referred to. The reason for the referen­
tial character of religious metaphorical language will therefore not so 
jnuch be any prior or 'given' knowledge of what is being referred to, 
but the fact that a speaker is a member of a linguistic community who 
has passed on the information, going back to the person or event itself 
(cf Kripke 1972: 295). The notion of reference here is obviously an 
epistemic one. And the issue at stake concerning this reference is the 
role of a concept or metaphor in making possible socially coordinated 
epistemic access to whatever is being referred to (cf Boyd 1980: 358).
On this view reference therefore depends on a chain of historical and 
contextual communication, and this chain of communication is there by 
virtue of the membership of a community which passes on a name, or 
the meaning of an event from link to link. What is impotant is not first 
of all how the speaker got the reference, but the actual chain of 
communication (cf Kripke 1972: 300). This obviously does not mean that 
every sort of causal chain reaching us will warrant reference: we refer to 
someone or something by virtue of our connection with other speakers 
in a community, going back to the referent itself. In some way the 
referent must be historically, or we might even say causally connected 
to the speech act (cf Donnellan 1972: 377).
From this we can conclude that if reference or reality-depiction in 
theology depends on both context and content and can be regarded as 
a statement dependent motion (cf Soskice 1987: 112), then theological 
statements derive from interpreted religious experience. In this sense 
the context as well as the content -  which have been 'passed on' in
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tradition and is now being refered to -  determine the meaning and 
cognitive claim of what is being referred to. It now not only becomes 
possible, through the provisional constructs of theological theories, to 
hx reference prior to and apart from any definitive knowledge, but in a 
critical realist interpretation of theory terms it is the metaphorical 
concepts that provide an epistemic access to that which is being 
referred to.
The function of metaphor and model in religious and theological 
language thus becomes crucial for a weak form of critical realism that is 
not set on presenting a strong defence of theism, but rather a justifica­
tion of the cognitive claims of theological reflection: why theological 
statements can claim to be about God at all. Theological theories, and 
their flexible and open-ended networks of metaphorical concepts, while 
not necessarily directly or exhaustively descriptive in a positivist or 
naive realist way, can nevertheless claim to be referential or reality- 
depicting. This not only justifies the use of metaphor in theory 
construction in theology and science, but also strengthens the case for 
a qualified form of critical realism in theology.
All language, but especially metaphorical language, is therefore 
contextual language embedded in certain traditions of conviction, 
reflection and investigation which in its turn determine the inter­
pretative character of experience. This is also true of theological 
language which basically reflects on religious experience and the 
ensuing religious language as ways to the Reality that Christians 
believe is God. But these experiences and their accompanying meta­
phorical language, can only be reliably interpreted in terms of the 
hermeneutical tradition of a linguistic community who has passed on 
the root metaphors of the Christian faith through a long historical and 
interpretative tradition going back to the classical texts of this tradition 
of faith. In this sense -  and not in any fundamentalistic sense -  the 
referential nature of the central metaphors of the Bible fixes the referent 
and in itself becomes a reality that functions epistemologically and 
hermeneutically as a very exclusive access to the Reality that is God. In 
this sense this classic text is the ultimate 'way' to the reality claimed by 
theology, an epistemological claim that might be defined as the realism 
of the text (cf Van Huyssteen 1987: 30).
In a very important way reference or reality-depiction as well as 
critical realism in theology is therefore supported by:
• the fact that the Bible, as classic text of the Christian faith has
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survived as a religious text and as a book of faith in a long and 
remarkable interpretative tradition of an ongoing faith context;
• the reality of ongoing faith experiences that this text has evoked 
through centuries of belief in God, and the way in which the same 
text today still appeals to Christian experience. Of these experience, 
of which God is believed to be the cause, theological theorizing 
provides interpretation and reinterpretation on the basis of the 
central metaphors of this text. This allows us to refer to God without 
describing him in terms of any definite prior knowledge or under­
standing;
• the metaphorical structure of bibhcal language and the continuity of 
reference this has creatively given to religious and theological 
language through the ages. This obviously presupposes a language- 
using community (cf Peacocke 1984: 47) going back to the initiating 
events when these metaphorical terms were first introduced and the 
referent fixed.
Reference in theology is therefore not determined by any prior know­
ledge of the referent but by the history of religious experience as 
contextual and relational, interpreted and mediated experience. Re­
ference or reality depiction thus directly relates to the fact that the 
speaker is a member of a community of speakers who -  through a 
tradition of historical links -  speak in a certain way, a way that implies 
certain 'baptismal events' as well as a corresponding commitment to an 
ultimate commitment, that is, to finding maximal meaning in life. After 
all, it is not words which refer but speakers using words who refer (cf 
Soskice 1985: 136).
A critical realist argument in theology thus becomes possible if we 
dispense with the empiricist dogma that reference is fixed only by 
unrevisable description or not at all (cf Soskice 1985: 151). What is more: 
the case for critical realism in theology can therefore never be argued 
only in terms of some form of explanatory success analoguous to that of 
the natural sciences, but in an important way becomes plausible in 
terms of metaphorical reference. And what is offered is no strong form 
of defense of theism but an attempt to argue how and why religious 
language and the theories of theology can claim to be about God at all. 
This also answers the question whether and to what extent an indivi­
dual's religious experience could provide a proper basis or a justifica­
tion of religious belief (cf Runzo & Ihara 1986: xi).
The difference between realism in science and critical realism in
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theology is obviously directly related to the difference in degree of a 
personal involvement in theology and science respectively. Not only 
can religious experiences not be repeated under controlled circumstan­
ces, but using them to fix reference involves commitment to the validity 
of the experience as reported by the experiencer (cf Soskice 1987: 115). 
Theology, in its attempt to obtain maximum intelligibility, thus makes 
claims based on religious experience. And as in science, although 
different from the kind on which scientific statements are based, this 
experience is understood as a context of shared assumption interpreted 
within the wider framework of a continuity of metaphorical reference. 
In both religion and science claims are made within a context of 
enquiry, but this does not deprive them of their referential value and 
therefore is not a relativist position. Those metaphoric and interpreted 
expressions around which the language of the Christian religion 
cluster, can in this sense be said to have justified themselves as 
meaningful and referential to vast numbers of people throughout the 
centuries and across cultures. It is this kind of experiential adequacy, 
and not a justified certainty, which makes a belief a responsible belief. 
And a model of rationality which can accommodate this, is already 
justifying its claim to epistemological adequacy.
EXPERIENCE AND EXPLANATION
The justification of cognitive claims in theology through the grounding 
of reference in religious experience is supported by the fact that 
scientists and philosophers of science have not as easily as literary 
critics and some theologians, turned to non-cognitivist views of meta­
phor. The most interesting metaphors in both theology and science are 
those which suggest an explanatory network and are vital at the 
'growing edges' of our reflection (cf Soskice 1985; lOlf). The crucial 
issue of course is: what do theological theories explain, and will a form 
of explanatory justification in theology have implications for the 
cognitive claims of theological theories? I would like to argue that 
although there might be no epistemological short cut possible from the 
exlanatory success in science to progress and problem-solving in 
theological theorizing, this explanatory progress elucidates rehgious 
experience and theological reflection in such a way that theology can 
indeed claim a form of truth approximation.
The belief that religious statements, and per implication also theo-
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logical theories, can never be seen as truly explanatory, remains an 
extraordinarily pervasive one (cf Schoen 1985: 24). Misconceptions as to 
the nature of science usually underlies those arguments that would 
want to object to any analogies between religious and scientific belief. 
The way contemporary philosophers of science deal with the problem 
of rationality in scientific reflection, has however done much to 
challenge this widely held prejudice. Over against Thomas S Kuhn's 
unability to account for the resolution of theoretical disagreements, and 
for the success of science, realism claims that many of the current 
theories of science are probably approximately true and that this 
assumption provides the best explanation for the success of science. 
The realist argument therefore in a very important way reveals the 
importance of inference to the best explanation for science (cf Banner 
1986: ii).
The type of critical realism that 1 would like to develop as a model of 
rationality for theology, would maintain that the same style of argument 
-  in conjunction with metaphorical reference and epistemic access to 
the referent of theological theorizing -  has a significant role to play in 
the justification of the cognitive claims of theology. This again, in spite 
of the admittedly different tasks of realism in theology and science, 
implies a strong analogy between religious and scientific belief. The 
notion that religious belief and the cognitive claims of theological 
reflection can be given some sort of explanatory justification rests on 
the supposition that these beliefs indeed function as explanations in 
theological argument. And if this is indeed so, Anthony O'Hear's 
conviction that the interpretation of religious experience is quite 
deficient in explanatory power (cf O'Hear 1984: 44ff), will not qualify as 
a 'better explanation' for the nature of theological theorizing.
Because of the referential nature and resulting reality depiction of 
theological statements, not only religious beliefs and practices, but also 
and especially theological theorizing are attempts to understand, where 
understanding can be construed as seeking the best explanation (cf 
Proudfoot 1985: 43). Of course there are important differences between 
the interpretation of religious experiences, the hermeneutical interpre­
tation of religious texts and methods of explanation in the mature 
sciences. But the interpretation of experience or texts does not preclude 
the further step of seeking the best explanation for a belief. In fact, 
finding better and more valid interpretations for experiential or con­
ceptual problems in theology (cf Van Huyssteen 1986: 206f), will imply 
an inference to the best explanation in theological theorizing. The
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approximate but tentative truth claim implied by this is what a weak 
form of critical realism is all about.
Representatives of the hermeneutical tradition and those of the 
natural sciences often see this interpretative tradition and inferential 
procedures as mutually exclusive. In theology, however, both these 
tasks, although different, are required to reach maximal intelligibility as 
the overall goal of theological theorizing. In fact, all contextual, expe­
riential and hermeneutical issues in theological theorizing presupposes 
an epistemological model of rationality. And the rationality of a critical 
realist theology is directly determined by the goals, that is, by the 
epistemic values of theological theorizing. As epistemic values or 
criteria for theology I would suggest:
• the reality depiction of theological statements, both in an ontological 
and contextual sense;
• the ability to critically identify and solve problems, in this case 
experiential and conceptual problems;
• the constructive and progressive nature of theological theorizing.
In the construction of theories in theology it thus becomes possible, in 
terms of epistemological and experiential adequacy, to identify, elimi­
nate or at least reduce experiential and conceptual problems. And 
although no strong claim for convergent truth can be shown to be 
plausible for theological theorizing, the arguments for explanatory 
progress and metaphorical reference does make it possible to claim 
truth approximation. In critical realism the only means open to us for 
judging the provisional or approximate truth of a theory is therefore 
through as assessment of its explanatory progress.
Explanatory progress in theology thus shows itself to be a form of 
inference to the best explanation: the approximate truth or likelihood of 
a theory depends on the degree of explanatory progress the theory 
enjoys. In theology a 'better' explanation or hypothesis is one that 
solves experiential problems as well as reduces conceptual problems 
arising from interpreted, mediated religious experience. This leads one 
to infer that such a theory is 'true' in the sense of highly likely, and can 
therefore claim approximate truth. To infer in this sense, is strictly 
speaking, to conjecture, and where inference comes in is in concluding 
that a specific theory is in fact the best available explanation. Eman 
McMullin (1986: 65) formulates it like this: 'we do not infer to the best 
explanation; we infer that a given explanation is the best available 
explanation'.
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In this sense, also in theology, we do not infer to the best explanation, 
but from the claim that a given theory is the best explanation to the 
conclusion that this explanatory hypothesis is highly hkely.
Inference from the best explanation, or rather from explanatory 
progress, commits the critical realist in theology to saying that there are 
good argumentative reasons for holding on to a theory, but not that 
there are compelling grounds. The logical possibility that even a highly 
progressive theory might be false, should thus in principle be held 
open. Any theory in theology may therefore be developed further and 
can in principle be revised and sharpened. The problem-solving and 
progressive nature of a theory in theological theorizing can therefore 
provisionally suggest truth approximation, but can never claim truth in 
a direct sense. In terms of the overall goal of intelligibility in theology, 
rationality in theology implies the acecptance of those models which are 
the most effective problem solvers.
Because of the metaphorical roots of these models and the epistemic 
notion of reference they imply, explanatory models in theology should 
indeed be taken seriously but not literally. The metaphors of our 
explanatory models and theories indeed refer, but because we have no 
(and need no) prior knowledge of that which is being referred to, this 
metaphorical reference and the resulting explanatory progress in theory 
constrution, can never be literal. They do, however, provide exciting 
epistemic access in the difficult process of theorizing in theology. The 
cognitive function of models in theological theorizing is therefore 
primary and forms the basis for all affective, hermeneutical and 
contextual claims in theology.
In theology, as in science, models are used as explanatory, and in 
both models are indispensable. And although the basis from which a 
model may claim to depict reahty differs between religious and scien­
tific ones, their application as explanatory is not as different as is so 
often suggested (cf Soskice 1985: 112).
RATIONALITY AND COMMITMENT
The central role of experience and explanation in the justification of the 
cognitive claims of theology, finally implies that the very important 
distinction between commitments, an ultimate commitment, beliefs 
and religious faith should always be maintained. I am also convinced 
that no strong form of justification is possible for a commitment to an
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ultimate commitment (ie, the search for maximal meaning in life), 
outside the way of life of which it forms part. This is no retreat to 
irrationalism, because experiential and epistemological adequacy -  and 
not justified certainty -  makes a commitment and its resulting beliefs 
and propositions valid and responsible. This also implies that the 
beliefs that are implied in a commitment (whether to realism, to the 
Christian faith or to critical realism in theology) should in principle 
always be open to criticism. This does not go against what, from a 
perspective of religious experience, could be called the certainty of 
k ith . It does, however, imply a highly critical sensitivity towards the 
construction of theories in theology and certainly prevents any form of 
dogmatism in theological theorizing.
In a critical realist model the beliefs implied in a commitment to an 
ultimate commitment could never be justified by any foundationalist 
doctrine of justification, but it might indeed be possible to provide 
good or adequate reasons for not giving up a commitment and its 
implied propositional beliefs. Beliefs are therefore never just the 'frills 
on a commitment' (cf Trigg 1977: 36), but can in a process of explanatory 
progress offer good reasons why it would make more sense (ie be more 
rational) to be committed to a certain way of life than not to be 
committed to it. In this sense there is no contrast between scientific and 
religious beliefs, nor between a commitment to realism in science or a 
commitment to critical realism in theology.
We could therefore say that all commitments must involve beliefs (are 
propositional) which might eventually turn out to be true or false. On 
this view -  which is also my own -  it is therefore not enough to 
maintain that beliefs have a 'truth' which is relative only to a group, a 
society or a conceptual system. Obviously a conceptual framework or 
paradigm could involve beliefs which are only true within this context, 
but eventually we are of course confronted with the meaningfulness or 
provisional truth of the paradigm as such, as well as being committed 
to a certain set of beliefs. Such a commitment should be based on beliefs 
which are themselves external to the system. This is what I tried to 
indicate throughout as epistemological adequacy: Beliefs that function 
as criteria for rationality or epistemic values in a critical realist approach 
to theorizing in theology.
Basic to all this is the conviction that there is an undeniable religious 
dimension to human existance and that this dimension would be 
unintelligible without reference to God or a transcendent being. Reli­
gious experience and theological explanations thus open up the way for
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a tentative, provisional justification of the cognitive claims of theology, 
and for the claim of theological statements to be about God at all. This 
weak form of critical realism therefore argues for the credibility of a 
commitment to the Christian faith. In this sense theology and its 
explanations might differ from the other sciences, but it certainly is no 
less rational.
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